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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 
Amicus curiae Ronald H. Filler --- is a Professor of Law and the Director of the 
Financial Services Law Institute at New York Law School. He is the co-author with 
Professor Markham of a casebook on derivatives regulation that discusses spoofing and 
other trade practice issues. He is also the author and co-author of numerous articles on 
futures regulation and has over forty years of experience in the futures industry as a lawyer 
and scholar.  Prof. Filler has taught a course on Commodities Law or Derivatives Law at 
four different U.S. law schools for over 30 years, starting in 1977. 
 
Amicus curiae Jerry W. Markham is a Professor of Law at the Florida International 
University College of Law. He is the author and co-author of seventeen books on financial 
markets, their history and regulation. He has also authored and co-authored dozens of law 
review articles and other publications on the regulation of futures and other derivative 
instruments. He was previously a Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina 
College of law and taught a course on commodity futures regulation for ten years at the 
Georgetown Law Center in Washington D.C.1 
 
 
1 Due to scheduling issues, the Amicus Professors were unable to notify the Solicitor 
General of their intent to file this brief ten days before its filing date as required by Supreme 
Court Rule 37.2(a). The Office of Solicitor General has, nevertheless, was asked by the 
amici on March 2, 2018 to consent to its filing. Notice has also been given to the Petitioner 
and the Respondent. No party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity 
other than amicus curiae have made a monetary contribution to the preparation or 
submission of this brief.  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The commodity futures markets play a vital role in the pricing of most of the 
world’s tradable commodities.2 The commodities underlying futures contracts include, 
agricultural products such as wheat and soybeans; petroleum products such as gas and oil; 
metals such as copper, gold and silver; and financial products, such as the S&P 500 stock 
index; Libor, the “world’s largest number;” and foreign currency exchange benchmarks, 
such as the exchange rate for the euro and the U.S dollar. Futures exchanges also play an 
essential role in pricing U.S Treasury securities.3 
 
Futures markets historically and legislatively required “open outcry” trading on 
exchange floors. While that structure required humans to interact with each other as 
evidenced in the movie, “Trading Places”, today, these markets are driven by high 
frequency traders (“HFTs”) that trade on electronic markets. HFTs enter and execute or 
cancel orders within fractions of a seconds, many times faster than you can blink your eye. 
Although as much as ninety percent of all HFT orders are cancelled after they are placed 
in the market, but before their actual execution, the government in this case seeks to 
criminalize any order that “is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, 
'spoofing' (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution).” 
7 U.S.C. §6c(a)(5). This new law on “spoofing” was enacted by the Dodd-Frank Act in 
July 2010.4 
 
They key element in this spoofing prohibition is that of intent or scienter, which 
according to the government does not include an intent to defraud.5 Rather, the government 
contends, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that it is enough to criminalize behavior merely 
if the actor intended to cancel an otherwise legitimate order before its entry. The 
government’s position and the Seventh Circuit’s decision ignore the fact that nearly every 
trader intends to cancel their limit orders before execution. For example, cancellation may 
be intended in advance of order entry if the market does not respond as predicted or where 
the order is entered to test market depth and liquidity. Traders are now left to guess when 
cancellations, which are essential to their business, are criminalized by Dodd-Frank.      
 
 
2  Commodity futures are “derivative” instruments that derive their value from an 
underlying commodity. See, Jerry W. Markham & Ronald H. Filler, REGULATION OF 
DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (SWAPS, OPTIONS, AND FUTURES) CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1-7 (2014) (describing futures contracts) (hereinafter “Filler & Markham”).   
3 “ Historically, commodity futures were traded primarily on agricultural products, but, 
today, most commodity futures contracts involve some type of financial instrument.” 
Filler & Markham, supra, n. 2  at p. 2. 
4 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–03, 
124 Stat.1376 (July 21, 2010) (“Dodd–Frank Act”). 
5 In contrast, see, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that there 
must be an intent to defraud and not mere negligence to establish a violation of an anti-
fraud statute). 
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The vagueness of this prohibition is also problematic because there was nothing 
“commonly known to the trade” as “spoofing” at the time of the enactment of this 
prohibition by Dodd-Frank that even remotely resembles the trading at issue in this case. 
“Spoofing” as charged in this case, was not commonly known in the industry.  Rather, 
spoofing has been viewed to be many other things in a variety of contexts.  
 
For example, spoofing had historically been associated with a drinking game, which 
“involved guessing how many coins the other player held in a closed fist.”6 In financial 
markets “spoofing” has been associated with fraud schemes under the federal securities 
laws involving emails with fake addresses that were purportedly discussing insider or other 
market sensitive information. The sender of these “spoofed” emails would then profit from 
market reactions to the false information. 7  The term spoofing was also later applied to 
“auto-execution” fraud in the securities markets involving a practice called “layering, an 
activity that was not based on order cancellations and was unrelated to any trading activity 
in futures contracts.8  
 
Spoofing was not applied to futures transactions until it appeared in the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010 with little or no advance warning and no hearings on the subject. There is thus 
no legislative history that would provide any basis for the assertion in the new statute that 
spoofing “is of the character of, or [was] commonly known to the trade as, ‘spoofing’ 
(bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution’).” 7 U.S.C. 
§6c(a)(5)(C). It is difficult to understand how legislation can criminalize conduct that is 
“commonly known” as spoofing in the futures industry when no such common knowledge 
ever existed prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010. 
 
This case provides this Court with the opportunity of addressing the scope of this 
fatherless crime and to resolve a critical issue that has plagued the courts for decades, i.e., 
can an “open market” trade that is otherwise permissible be made illegal solely by the 
 
6 Ken Follett, JACKDAWS 302 (2002) (electronic version) (describing this game). See also, 
Benjamin L. Schwartz. Solution of a Set of Games. 66 AM. MATH. MONTHLY, 693 (1959) 
(describing this game). 
7  Jerry W. Markham, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET 
MANIPULATION 334-335 (M.E. Sharpe 2014) (hereinafter “LAW ENFORCEMENT”). 
8 This practice was described by the SEC in a footnote In the Matter of Yoshikawa, 2006 
SEC LEXIS 948 n. 36 S.E.C. (2006) that is less than elucidating: 
 
‘Auto-execution manipulation’ is also commonly referred to as ‘spoofing’ . . . . See, 
e.g. Ian Fishman and Laurence Fishman, Exchange Act Rel. No. 40115 (June 24, 
1998), 67 SEC Docket 1107 (order accepting offer of settlement and finding 
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 where respondents entered 100-share 
limit orders to alter the NBBO [National Best Bid or Offer], followed with larger 
limit orders at the new NBBO, then entered a new 100-share limit order to change 
the NBBO again, following again with a larger limit order taking advantage of the 
second new NBBO respondents had created); . . .  
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perceived intent of the trader in entering the order. An open market trade is one in which  
there are real parties and real economic risk. The circuit court opinions on this issue are 
divided and have led to much confusion in the courts and among practioners and scholars 
seeking to understand its scope and application.9 
 
In light of these conflicting decisions and the advent of electronic trading, the 
spoofing prohibition makes it untenable for traders to engage in many legitimate trading 
strategies useful to market liquidity and efficiency. This uncertainty subjects traders to the 
risk of second-guessing by prosecutors singling out trades among hundreds of millions of 
cancellation orders that are in fact legitimate open market transactions.  
 
Vague and uncertain prohibitions against order cancellations will inhibit efficient 
price discovery. This is because traders will be unable to determine the wholly uncertain 
line of when a cancellation instruction becomes illegal “spoofing” in the mind of a 
prosecutor. Market efficiency depends on traders to be allowed to trade without fear of 
after the fact determinations of their intent in markets where speed and cancellations are 
essential to their trading plans and market efficiency.  
 
This situation is even more troubling in view of the fact that  the governing 
regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has not clearly 
identified which order cancellations are valid and which orders constitute “spoofing”. What 
then constitutes the “intent” element which must be proven? Guidance from this court is 
sorely needed because “spoofing” is now being broadly targeted by prosecutors and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) in a number of cases brought 
nationwide.10 Moreover, the CFTC has only won one market manipulation case prior to 
 
9 See, Filler & Markham, supra, n. 2, 528-540 (discussing “open market” manipulations 
and split in case law).  
10 See, Department of Justice (“DOJ”) prosecutions, in addition to this case: U.S. v. Sarao, 
15 CR 75 (N.D. Ill.). DOJ charged eight traders on January 29, 2018: Six of those traders 
were indicted in the Northern District of Illinois: - One was charged in the District of 
Connecticut: Andre Flotron – Another was  charged in the Southern District of Texas: 
Krishna Mohan. The CFTC has brought the following cases and resulting settlements: In 
the Matter of UBS AG, CFTC Doc. No. 18-07 (Jan. 29, 2018) ($15 million fine); In the 
Matter of Deutsche Bank, CFTC Doc. No. 18-06 (Jan. 29, 2018) ($30 million fine); In the 
Matter of HSBC, CFTC Doc No. 18-08 (Jan. 29, 2018) ($1.6 million fine); In the Matter 
of Arab Global Commodities DMCC, CFTC Doc. No. 18-01 (Oct. 10, 2017) ($300,000 
fine); In the Matter of The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., CFTC Doc. No. 17-21 
(Aug. 7, 2017) ($600,000 fine); In the Matter of Posen, CFTC Doc. No. 17-20 (July 26, 
2017) ($635,000 fine); In the Matter of Liew, CFTC Doc. No. 17-14 (June 2, 2017) 
(permanent trading bar); In the Matter of Brims, CFTC Doc. No. 17-13 (March 30, 2017) 
($200,000 fine); In the Matter of Gola, CFTC Doc. No. 17-12 (March 30, 2017) ($350,000 
fine); In the Matter of Citigroup Global Markets, CFTC Doc. No. 17-06 (Jan. 19, 2017) 
($25 million fine); CFTC v. Khara, Case No. 15 CV 03497 (S.D.N.Y March 31, 2016) 
(Permanent Injunction) and CFTC v. Oystacher, 15 CV 9196 (N.D. Ill.) ($2.5 million fine) 
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the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act because it could not prove this intent element. The 
Dodd-Frank Act did not remove the intent element. Proving this intent element must be the 
foundation of every civil enforcement and criminal prosecution case. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. Economics of Commodities Trading 
Derivative markets perform two essential functions: (1) price discovery; and (2) 
hedging. Price discovery is important because it allows market participants to value their 
tradable assets without actually having to sell those items. Such price results in the U.S. 
futures markets being transparent, meaning that all investors around the globe know at that 
split second what the price is for a particular commodity.11  
 
There are essentially two broad categories of traders in the commodities markets—
hedgers and speculators. Hedging is important because it allows a market participant, such 
as an asset manager, to offset risks from exposure to financial instruments in an asset-based 
portfolio or that the portfolio manager anticipates buying in the future. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982) (describing the role and 
importance of hedging).  
 
The second category of commodity futures traders is the speculator.12 In Merrill 
Lynch v. Curran, 453 U.S. 353, 358, (1982), this Court noted that speculation in futures 
contracts serves an important price discovery function. “The advent of speculation in 
futures markets produced well-recognized benefits for producers and processors of 
agricultural commodities.” Id. This Court further recognized that “[t]he liquidity of a 
futures contract, upon which hedging depends, is directly related to the amount of 
speculation that takes place.” Id. at 359.  
 
Speculators utilize a broad range of trading styles that exhibit differing patterns in the 
frequency of their trading. For example, “scalpers” (as they were called on exchange 
floors), and now high frequency traders (“HFTs”) on electronic markets, move quickly in 
and out of positions and rapidly entering and cancelling orders, seeking to take advantage 
of rapid price changes. 
 
II. Growth of Electronic Trading 
Historically, trading on futures exchanges took place on trading floors divided into 
separate trading “pits” for each commodity traded. The trading pits, at least the more active 
ones, contained numerous floor brokers and floor traders who traded in sometimes chaotic 
 
(Amicus Professor Jerry Markham acted as an expert witness in Oystacher for the 
defendants). 
11 See, Filler & Markham, supra, n. 2 at 24-25 (describing role of futures trading in price 
discovery). 
12 Id. at 25 (describing importance of speculation in futures contracts).   
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conditions. Floor trading executions often involved several minutes to execute and report 
filled orders to customers and process the orders for referral to the clearinghouse.  
 
The open outcry system’s slow executions exposed traders to a market risk inherent in 
delays, from that “latency.” This is because latency creates a risk that market prices could 
change adversely between the time of order entry and execution. This risk is referred to as 
“slippage.” Slippage is one of the most significant costs to traders.  
 
Computerized trading platforms began appearing in the futures and securities markets 
during the last decade of the twentieth century. These electronic platforms provided order-
matching services that proved to be an efficient alternative to floor trading by open outcry. 
In recent decades, most floor trading has virtually ceased and has been replaced by 
electronic trading platforms operated by the commodity futures exchanges.  
 
An order is executed through an electronic trading platform where buyers and sellers 
are matched by algorithmic formulas that generally make these matches based on time and 
price priority. 13  HFTs employ computer technology and algorithms that allow the 
origination, transmission and execution of their orders in times measured in fractions of a 
second, “a thousand times faster than you can blink your eyes.”14 High speed trading 
reduces risks of “slippage” in prices resulting from delays in order entry and execution, 
i.e., “latency.”15 HFTs have replaced floor traders as the source of liquidity in futures 
markets, without which those markets cannot function efficiently. 
 
HFTs minimize latency and slippage by the entry of their orders through high-speed 
data transmission lines and devices. One HFT trader spent $300 million to build a high-
speed data line between New Jersey and Chicago in order to reduce order latency by three 
milliseconds. A millisecond is one thousandth of a second. Another fiber optic project of a 
HFT sought to cut five milliseconds off order entry times between London and New York 
at a cost of a projected $500 million. Microwave transmissions were even faster and efforts 
are underway to reduce latency through laser communications.16 
 
The HFT’s efforts to reduce latency had remarkable success. “Public data from one 
exchange group, for example, indicates that round trip trade times on its trading platform 
 
13 See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of 
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865 (Summer 2008) 
(describing that transformation). 
14 Jerry W. Markham, High Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity Markets—From 
Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO  L. REV. 555, 562 (2015) (“High Speed 
Trading”). 
15  Irene Aldridge, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC 
STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS, 43–44 (2d ed. 2013); Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 
S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. App. 2003) (“The time expended in placing phone calls allowed 
market positions . . . to change, often resulting in serious losses . . . . The negative effect 
resulting from such a delay is known in the industry as ‘slippage.’”). 
16 High Speed Trading, supra, n. 14, at 561. 
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fell from 127 milliseconds in 2004 to 4.2 milliseconds in 2011.”17 “Another exchange 
group reported in 2010 that its average blended transaction time in futures and OTC 
markets was 1.25 milliseconds.”18 In 2014, one exchange determined that 11 percent of all 
2014 observable orders lasted less than one millisecond.19 “In today’s electronic financial 
markets, a single investor can execute more than 10,000 trades a second, meaning more 
than 1,000 trades can happen in the blink of an eye.”20  
 
One study found that automated trading systems, i.e., those initiated by algorithms that 
do not require human intervention in order to issue an order, accounted for the majority of 
equity futures.21 This growth in HFT trading largely occurred before the enactment of the 
anti-spoofing prohibition in the Dodd-Frank Act and there was nothing in the industry 
commonly known as spoofing before that legislation. 
 
III. Order Entry 
 
There are numerous types of orders for futures contracts that may be entered by traders. 
The most basic order is a “market” order. This means that the order is to be executed at the 
current market price. However, latency may result in slippage, which means that the market 
order may be executed at an unfavorable price. To avoid such concerns, traders often use 
“limit “orders. A “limit” order is one in which the trader specifies a price that it may be 
executed at in the market.22 This limitation helps protects the trader from a loss from 
adverse market moves that may result from latency and slippage.  
 
Limit orders comprise a large percentage of all orders entered on futures markets. A 
limit order posted in the order book is only good until cancelled by the trader. All market 
participants know that a limit order may be cancelled at any time.  
 
In fact, every speculator intends to cancel trades before their execution for a broad 
range of reasons, hence the high cancellation rates. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of 
 
17  CFTC, “Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated 
Trading Environments,” 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,546 (Sept. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted).  
18 Id. (footnote omitted). 
19 Equedia, How Fast is High-Frequency Trading? Faster Than You Think, available at 
http://www.equedia.com/how-fast-is-high-frequency-trading/ (accessed on March 4, 
2018). 
20  High-Frequency Traders Need a Speed Limit, BloomBergView,  available at 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-25/high-frequency-traders-need-a-
speed-limit (accessed on March 4, 2018). 
21 Richard Haynes & John S. Roberts, Automated Trading in Futures Markets, 4 (March 
13, 2015), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_automate
dtrading.pdf (accessed on March 4, 2018).    
22  See, CFTC, Glossary of Terms, available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm 
(accessed on March 4, 2018) (defining limit order).  
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all limit orders entered on electronic trading platforms are cancelled before they are 
executed. That is, most, HFT traders enter futures orders with the intent to cancel the bid 
or offer, as demonstrated by statistics showing a cancellation rate of ninety percent.  
 
Order entry and cancellations also occur at a high rate of speed. A study conducted 
by the Congressional Research Service (the “CRS Study”) of HFT trading found from data 
generated in 2013 that:  
 
about 39% of all canceled orders were initially active for a half of one 
second or less [i.e., 500 milliseconds or less and] about 27% of executed 
trades were the result of another trader accessing posted orders within that 
window of time. The office also found that although 23% of all 
cancellations occurred within 50 milliseconds, approximately 19% of all the 
monitored trades took place within that time frame.23  
 
This high rate of cancellation and the rapidity of order executions is due to the nature 
of the trading by HFTs who seek quick in-and-out profits. Many HFT traders enter orders 
they intend to cancel where the market does not respond as predicted by the trader upon 
the order’s entry. Other traders enter orders they intend to cancel in order to test the market 
by “pinging” it. Other traders enter orders they intend to cancel in order to conceal their 
actual trading strategies from other traders seeking to take advantage of an observed trading 
pattern.  
 
Other traders may have preset cancellation instructions if an order is not immediately 
filled or only partially filled. Do all of these orders constitute “spoofing”, any of them?  We 
do not believe so. Query, how do you pick and choose which orders are spoofing and which 
are not and how are traders to know when their cancellations cross the spoofing line? 
And, more importantly, how do you prove the requisite intent element by singling out a 
few of the thousands of orders placed by a HFT? 
 
IV. The “Open Market” Trading Controversy 
 
Trading in futures contracts is regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 
(7 U.S.C. §1 et seq.).(“CEA”) The Financial Crisis of 2008 led to the extension of 
regulation under the CEA by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 and to the creation of the crime 
of “spoofing.” That amendment gave rise to the existing controversy, in which the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that a fraud based standard could be based on intent without a showing 
of actual or attempted fraud, i.e., is it enough to prove a pre-existing intent to cancel an 
order even if done without any fraudulent intent? 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in this case has exposed a rift in the circuit courts that 
concerning whether a so-called “open market” trade (i.e., a trade in which there are real 
parties and real economic risk that is otherwise legitimate) can be rendered fraudulent 
 
23 Congressional Research Service, High-Frequency Trading: Background, Concerns, and 
Regulatory Developments 20 (June 19, 2004).  
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based solely on the intent of the actor. 24  The present case provides this Court with the 
opportunity of resolving this critical issue.  
 
The circuit court opinions on this issue are conflicting and confusing. For example, the 
Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177 (2011) held that traders could dissemble to 
other market participants concerning their trading intentions because there is no obligation 
under the CEA or other laws to disclose trading strategies to other market participants. The 
Third Circuit also appears to have generally rejected the imposition of liability for open 
market trades, even if entered with bad intent. GFL Advantage Fund Ltd. V. Colkitt, 272 
F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 923 (2002) (“courts must distinguish 
between legitimate trading strategies intended to anticipate and respond to prevailing 
market forces and those designed to manipulate prices and deceive purchasers and sellers.”) 
 
The Second Circuit has handed down rulings on this issue that are confusing. Compare, 
U.S. v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 370-371 (2d Cir. 1991) (no manipulation found where 
transaction was in open market), with,  U.S. v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1991), 
amended on other grounds, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, sub nom., Zarzechi 
v. U.S., 504 U.S. 940 (1992) (illegal manipulation found for open market trades where  
trader was trying to depress prices), and, ATSI Communications v. The Shaar Fund Ltd., 
493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) (short selling to the distress of other market participants not 
actionable in absence of showing intent to create an artificial price).25  
 
The D.C. Circuit has deferred to the SEC in concluding that otherwise permissible open 
market trades can be rendered fraudulent solely by the trader’s intent. Markowski v. SEC, 
274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 819 (2002). The Seventh Circuit 
has apparently joined the D.C. Circuit’s views in its decision in this case.    
 
In light of these conflicting and confusing decisions, and the advent of electronic 
trading in which order cancellations are an integral part, the spoofing prohibition makes it 
untenable to traders engaging in legitimate trading strategies. The vagueness of this 
criminal statute subjects traders to the risk of second-guessing by prosecutors singling out 




24 See, LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra, n. 7, §8:3, at 378-386. 
25 As a judge in the Southern District of New York has noted “the law of the Second Circuit 
on the so-called open manipulation – where the the alleged manipulator has made otherwise 
legitimate trades, yet with the subjective intent to affect the stock price thereby—is not 
fully settled”25 citing the Mulheren decision. Nanopierce Technologies, Inc. v. Southridge 
Capital Management, LLC, 2002 WL 31819207, at 7 (S.D.N.Y.). See also, SEC v. Masri, 
523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (the issue of open market trade violations 
remains open in Second Circuit and is a matter of uncertainty). See generally, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, supra, n. 7, §8:3, pp. 378-385 (discussing these decisions and the 
uncertainty they have created.)  
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V. Trading is a Competition and Traders Must Conceal Their True Intentions 
in Order to be Successful 
 
The Seventh Circuit decision in this proceeding condemns Coscia for “fostering the 
illusion of demand.” Slip Op. at 8. That conclusion ignores the fact that illusions of market 
demand and the concealment of  actual trading strategies of market participants has been 
an integral part of trading markets since their inception. This is not a moral issue. To the 
contrary, in considering application of the open market trade doctrine, it necessary to 
understand that trading is a competition and that concealment of actual trading strategies 
is an integral part of that competition, as is the case for nearly every other form of 
competition.  
 
In football, concealment of the actual strategy for each play is critical to success, and 
include such things as “statue of liberty” and “pass-action” plays, and “quarterback 
sneaks.” In volleyball, the setter tries to fool opponents on where the ball will be placed for 
return. Baseball pitchers disguise their pitches to fool batters. Hockey players try to deceive 
the goalie as to where the puck will be sent, and on and on.  
 
Trading in financial markets is no less a competition. As Professor Thomas A. 
Hieronymus noted some years ago:  
 
[f]utures trading is a contact sport played by competitive people who place 
a high value on winning. A futures market is not a scholarly seminar in 
which learned men debate what is, and arrive at, an equilibrium price; it is 
a game in which businessmen compete, with money at hazard, to establish 
a market price that works. Competition is sometimes a vicious business but 
it works well.26 
 
Traders “disguise their intentions like secret agents.”27 As a part of that competition, 
active traders try to mask their trading from other market participants, particularly HFTs. 
This is because a popular HFT strategy is “liquidity detection,” which employs algorithms 
to take advantage of other traders by detecting and predicting their trading plans or 
practices based on prior activity.28 Active traders, therefore, seek to avoid trading in sizes, 
amounts or frequencies that can be detected by HFTs.29  
 
 
26  Thomas Hieronymus, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADINGFOR COMMERCIAL AND 
PERSONAL PROFIT 327-328 (1977). 
27  William L. Silber, VOLCKER 289 (2012). 
28 Irene Aldridge, High-Frequency Trading: A Practical Guide to Algorithmic Strategies 
and Trading Systems 17 (2d ed. 2013). 
29 “Investors submitting large volume orders for . . . futures and options may wish to 
conceal the full size of their order to avoid anticipatory action from other market 
participants.” Interactive Brokers, Iceberg/Reserve Orders, available at 
https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/?f=%2Fen%2Ftrading%2Forders%2Ficeberg.php 
(accessed on March 4, 2018). 
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As the CFTC has noted, “order shredding” is a popular deception or illusion used to 
disguise from and deceive other traders concerning the entry of large orders: 
 
For example, buy-side firms (such as mutual funds and pension funds) may use 
automated systems and execution algorithms to ‘‘shred’’ one or more large orders 
(called ‘parent orders’) into a series of smaller trades (‘child orders’) to be executed 
over time. . . . . In addition to automated execution, ATSs may also operate market-
making programs; opportunistic, cross-asset and cross-market arbitrage programs; and 
a number of other strategies.30 
 
The entry of limit orders by HFTs is also necessarily coupled with the intent to cancel 
those orders. That is, if the order is not executed at the limit price or better, the trader 
intends to cancel the order before its execution and often within fractions of a second. Such 
orders have long been used in the futures markets, albeit at slower speeds, and are common 
industry custom and practice.  
 
As another example, orders entered by the same trader on the opposite side of the 
market at the same price results in the automatic cancellation of the first set of orders. Still 
other traders “ping” the market by sending out orders they intend to cancel if not executed 
immediately. This allows price discovery and permits traders to determine the price at 
which liquidity may be present. These order cancellation practices serve as  a price 
discovery function, not fraud.  
 
Still other traders may show interest on one side of the market in order to deceive other 
traders as to their true market objectives. This practice has been common to the organized 





We believe that the language in Section 4c(a)(5) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(5), is 
unconstitutionally vague and that the criminal conviction of the Petitioner should be 
reversed.  There was never any “commonly known” concept of “spoofing” prior to the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010, and none exists even today. 




Ronald H. Filler  Jerry W. Markham 
 
30 CFTC, Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading 
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,544 (proposed Sept. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted)  
31 See e.g., LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra, n. 7, at 388 (describing the trading acumen of 
Nathan Rothschild in the 1820s in first entering sell orders in the market in order to disguise 
and deceive other traders from discovering the fact that that he actually was intending 
subsequently to engage in large purchases).  
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